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This article examines the role of the State, institutions and financial
markets in the financing of economic development, and in particular the
role of development banks. It touches on the limitations of today’s
conventional approach to development financing problems. It stresses
information asymmetries as a cause of credit rationing and the poor
distribution of savings. It also offers an analysis of the role of the State
and markets in development financing, together with a policy agenda
suggested by the different approach set forth here. It concludes with
some considerations concerning problems and challenges now facing
development financing in Latin America.
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I
Introduction
In recent years, economists have been taking a renewed
interest in the role played by the State in development
financing. This interest almost disappeared from the
theoretical debate after 1973, when Shaw and
McKinnon put forward the thesis that financial
liberalization would solve the problem on its own by
enabling long-term financing mechanisms to be created
in the private sector.
In contrast to the liberal outlook inherent in Shaw
and McKinnon’s models, neo-Keynesian writers have
set out to study the distribution problems caused in
credit and capital markets by information asymmetries.
Our view is that, while this approach has yielded sound
arguments for public policy involvement in
development financing, it is still analytically and
politically ambiguous and excessively vague as a guide
to government policy.
From the analytical point of view, this ambiguity
stems from at least two elements: i) the conceptualization
of financing in capitalist economies, according to
which financial institutions (including banks) are
regarded simply as intermediaries between savers and
investors, with a merely passive role in determining the
volume of funds for investment financing, and ii) the
definition of information problems (asymmetry) in the
financial intermediation process, which leaves out the
concept of uncertainty in the Keynesian/Knightian
sense.1
From the political point of view, the ambiguity (as
many conservative writers have explicitly stated)
concerns the scope and the ultimate outcome of State
intervention, in the light of what is now a long-standing
debate about market failures versus State failures. This
is because it is usually not made clear whether the State
should confine itself to improving information
distribution and regulatory mechanisms, or whether it
should finance sectors directly, in which case it is also
necessary to determine which sectors should be so
benefited.
This article offers a constructive critique of these
models, based on a different approach that stresses the
role of institutions and uncertainty in the problematic
of development financing. Consequently, the analysis
offers a more positive view of the role of the State in
this field and puts forward a policy agenda that, in
theory, could guide financing and institutional
development policies in the financial market.
The article is divided into five sections.
Following this introduction, section II undertakes a
critical examination of the conventional approach to
the problems entailed in development financing;
section III presents an alternative approach based on
a Keynesian outlook; section IV considers what
policy agenda arises from the approach presented in
the previous section, and section V brings a summary
and conclusions.
1
 This omission is particularly serious given that one of the funda-
mental characteristics of developing economies is the continuous
emergence of new sectors, the introduction of new technologies
and the creation of new markets. These are, by definition, situations
of uncertainty, since there are no past data that can easily be drawn




All theories need a stylization of the ideal operating
conditions for the object of analysis. In physics
models, for example, results are always calculated for
“normal conditions of temperature and pressure”. By
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positing this “ideal environment” we can characterize
the process in its unadulterated state and evaluate
results that appear to differ from those predicted by
the theory.
The same procedure is used in economic theory:
a model is created for the operation of markets and
their agents in what is considered to be an ideal
environment. As we are dealing with social systems,
and thus with human institutions, this task is obviously
far more complex, not only because the object of
analysis (economic organization) may be interpreted
differently depending on the theoretical and ideological
position of the analyst, but also because it alters over
time.
Despite this complexity, in financial intermediation
and development financing theory, as in other areas of
economics, stylization of the object is vital for
establishing whether particular markets and agents are
working efficiently (by comparison with our ideal
model), detecting the failures and “noise” that could
be preventing markets from operating properly, and
working out policies to remedy possible failures in the
intermediation process.
One of the most conventional stylizations of
financial intermediation and development financing
issues is taken from the neoclassical capital market
model and termed the efficient markets hypothesis
(Lewis, 1992). In the first case, the market is composed
of two optimizing agents: savers and investors. Savers
(suppliers of savings) have defined intertemporal
preferences and investors (users of capital) carry out
production functions, and therefore have specific
marginal capital productivity curves. The capital
market and financial institutions are defined as the
locus and as the agents through which the
intermediation of savings takes place, respectively.
According to this model, savers and financial
intermediaries have, under ideal conditions, all the
information and instruments they need to determine
their portfolio composition, and there is no lack of
investment financing sources. Some investments go
unfinanced because their returns are lower than savers
ask, given their intertemporal preferences.
According to the efficient markets hypothesis,
capital markets are efficient if they fully and accurately
reflect all information in setting the prices of financial
securities (Malkiel, 1994, p. 739). In its most categorical
form, this theory suggests that, notwithstanding the
possible (short-term) volatility of financial asset prices,
these change over the long term in accordance with the
underlying economic variables of the agents who issue
them (Wicksell’s natural rate of interest).2 This
hypothesis, then, simply complements or reinforces the
idea that savings are allocated efficiently to the most
profitable investments, in accordance with the
intertemporal preferences of savers.
In the conventional model, then, the financial
system is defined as a locus or passive intermediary
that does not influence the volume and quality of
investment financing funds. Its efficiency is gauged
simply by its ability to distribute information among
productive investors and savers, the “real actors” in the
financial market. Vittas and Cho summarize this point
of view as follows:
“In an ideal world in which economic information
is complete and readily available, the financial
system is passive. Investors fund the projects that
yield the highest returns, and neither governments
nor financial institutions need to improve the
allocation of credit. In the real world, however,
information is highly imperfect and costly to
acquire, and the allocation of credit suffers from
the unequal distribution of information, the costs
of monitoring and verification, and the cost of
default or contract enforcement. Under these
conditions, credit is not necessarily allocated to
its best use” (Vittas and Cho, 1997, p. 278).
When the conventional approach is applied to the
analysis of development financing problems, the
outcome is that only two reasons (“failures” or
“impurities”) can be found to justify active government
policy intervention in the financing process:
i) markets are incomplete (underdeveloped) and thus
cannot act as efficient intermediaries between
savers and investors, and
ii) there are significant information failures that
prevent markets from distributing savings
efficiently.
For at least the last three decades, as we shall now
see, these have been the two main focuses of most of
the conventional development financing analyses that,
emphasizing one aspect or the other, have provided the
basis for policy-making.
2
 See Andersen (1983-1984) for an analysis of the efficient markets
hypothesis.
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1. Incomplete markets and financial repression
Half a century ago, Gurley and Shaw (1955) recognized
that the capacity to finance growth might be
constrained when there were no markets capable of
matching the maturities of surplus spending units
(savers) and deficit units (investors). If the market were
incomplete the supply of credit would be below
potential and the level of accumulation thus lower than
it would otherwise have been.
In our view, this would be an interesting way of
analysing the problem of development financing had
it not come to be generally understood as a by-product
of the conventional approach described. This by-
product, which has been of the greatest importance
because of its influence on the financial policies of
developing countries (and even some developed ones),
is the range of so-called financial liberalization models
that have come out of Shaw and McKinnon’s seminal
studies of 1973. Those authors share Gurley and Shaw’s
(1955) opinion that financial underdevelopment is a
serious obstacle to development. The difference
between the two types of analysis is that financial
liberalization models link financial underdevelopment
(incomplete financial markets) with prolonged
“financial repression” in such economies.3 In other
words, “financial underdevelopment” (defined here as
lack of financial depth) is put down exclusively to
misguided interest-rate repression and selective lending
policies.
To Shaw and McKinnon’s way of thinking, State
intervention in capital markets is not justified by
failures of intermediation due to incomplete markets.
Rather, it is because of the intervention itself that
markets remain incomplete. Using these authors’ work
as a starting point, economic development theory came
to regard the issues raised by Gurley and Shaw in the
1950s —the problems of financial underdevelopment
and its negative effects on development, and the role
of the State in mitigating these effects— as secondary
matters that could be resolved fairly easily by financial
liberalization.4
Models like the one suggested by Shaw and
McKinnon provided a theoretical justification for some
failed attempts at financial liberalization, whose
disastrous outcome was that instead of the supply of
lending and investment resources expanding as
expected, financial instability increased and was often
followed by the failure of banks and enterprises, in
addition to economic recession.5
Perhaps the clearest lesson from these experiences
is that the problem of incomplete markets in
development financing is not resolved simply by
reducing the role of the State in capital markets,
deregulating, and freeing up interest rates. In fact, the
institutions and markets which we term the financial
system are usually the outcome of decades of trial and
error by private-sector agents, working under the
stimulus of policy and regulation. In the case of
development financing (and financial market
institutions) it can be seen that institutional experiences
and configurations differ widely, in both developed and
developing economies.6 This subject, which is perhaps
the most important in this article, will be returned to
later.
2. Information asymmetries and distribution
problems
By moderating the typical Walrasian model hypothesis
concerning the perfect distribution of information,
authors such as Stiglitz have been able to show that
there are problems with the distribution of long-term
funding (such as credit or even equity rationing) caused
by failures of information distribution.
According to this view, then, information
asymmetries can introduce financial market
inefficiencies that may have considerable real
quantitative effects (Gertler, 1988, p. 560). In other
words, lenders (direct or intermediary) have difficulty
in distinguishing between good projects (for instance,
profitable investment projects with a low risk of
default) and bad ones. To avoid adverse selection risk
and moral hazard, the rational solution for the lender
is to set interest rates lower than the capital market
equilibrium rate and ration credit. Besides distorting
the distribution of funds,7  this leads, as Stiglitz and
3
 See Studart (1999) for a critical analysis of these models.
4
 See, for example, Gertler (1988) and Gersovitz (1988).
5
 Studart (1999) presents a bibliography of papers that describe the
failure of attempts at financial liberalization as a way of expanding
sources of development financing. Of these papers, perhaps the most
striking is that by Díaz-Alejandro (1985).
6
 Howells and Bain (1997, chapters 16-19) give a description of the
fundamental differences between the financial market institutions
of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France and
Italy. See Zysman (1983) for a more detailed analysis of the effects
of these institutional systems on investment financing mechanisms.
7
 A typical instance of the “lemon” problem as proposed by Akerlof
(1970).
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Weiss (1981) have shown, to a reduction in the credit
supply.8 Faced with these failures, the State would
seem to have an important enabling role to play,
supplying credit to rationed sectors and bringing
sectors with good prospects to the attention of
intermediaries and savers.9
This approach has been criticized on two counts:
i) if the problem is due to failures of information
distribution, then more careful regulation, with
internationally accepted rules of disclosure, and recent
advances in the production and distribution of
information (such as the emergence of private-sector
risk-rating agencies) should make State intervention
unnecessary, and ii) if there are market failures, what
guarantee is there that they will be worse than
government failures?10
By contrast with analyses based on Gurley and
Shaw’s models, those that follow Stiglitz’s (1993)
thinking play down the problem of financial
underdevelopment (the fact that financial markets are
incomplete) when examining the difficulties of
development financing. This is because for Stiglitz the
problem is purely macroeconomic (information
asymmetry) and independent of the institutional
structure (size and organization of financial markets)
in which financial intermediation occurs. Again,
because the problem is one of poor information
distribution, it makes no difference whether economies
are slow- or fast-growing, or whether they have
undergone deep structural changes or not. In our view,
these two aspects are major gaps in any attempt to
understand the problems of development financing.
8 This analysis runs directly counter to the theory of financial
repression: “This is important because the original critique of
interest-rate ceilings was that they created a credit rationing problem.
The ceiling prevented the price of credit from rising until demand
for credit equalled supply. It is now believed that credit will be
rationed even without the ceilings set by policy” (United Nations,
1999, p. 138).
9
 See Stiglitz and Uy (1996) for an application of this approach to
the analysis of the South-East Asian experience.
10
 This is the tenor of the following comments by Jamarillo-Vallejo
(1994, p. 53) on Stiglitz (1993) at the Annual Meeting of the World
Bank, which echo many current criticisms of development financing
institutions: “In his paper Stiglitz is asking us to assume that
governments all over the world —especially developing countries—
are wise, fair and efficient enough to carry out the kind of ‘perfect’
intrusive intervention suggested by him. It is as if the world of the
second best had just been discovered and we had not learned from
the experience with the different forms of government intervention
that we have seen in this century.” Vittas and Cho also raise this
dilemma in the same terms: “Ultimately, however, the advantages
depend on the motivation and efficiency of the government involved.
Governments do not always ‘do the right thing’. Government
involvement in credit allocation can, and often does, result in rent
seeking by borrowers, corruption by bankers and government
officials, and crowding out of other worthwhile projects” (Vittas
and Cho, 1997, p. 280; my italics).
11
 See Carvalho (1992, part I) for a post-Keynesian analysis of the
foundations of Keynes’s theory.
III
Investment financing and market structures:
beyond the conventional approach
In several passages of the General Theory (Keynes,
1936), and in later articles, Keynes insisted that
investment was the determining factor in income and
saving. This reversed the direction of causality
identified by the conventional approach, as was
logically required by his principle of effective
demand.11 The switch points, in turn, to a hierarchy of
agents in the financing mechanisms of capital
formation in capitalist economies:
i) as Wicksell also concluded, it is banks, and not
savers, that play a fundamental role in determining
the aggregate supply of investment financing
sources, and thus “in the transition from a lower
to a higher scale of activity” (Keynes, 1937,
p. 668);
ii) saving is a result of the investment process, and
not a prerequisite for investment;
iii) the allocation of savings that are generated by the
income multiplication process is important for
dealing with problems resulting from the growing
mismatch between maturities during economic
growth, and
iv) the preference of banks and securities holders for
liquidity, and not the intertemporal preference of
consumers, is what determines the volume and
maturities of investment financing.
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The differences between Keynes’s approach and
the conventional model are not merely semantic: the
Keynesian model has a “stylization” of its own,
embracing the microeconomic, macroeconomic and
institutional dimensions of the investment financing
process. This stylization can be used as an alternative
to the conventional approach when examining the role
of the State, markets and institutions in development
financing. This is what will be explained now.
1. Mismatched maturities and credit rationing in
a development context
A large proportion of development financing needs are
for long-term funding. Productive investment usually
goes to fixed assets, which take a long time to generate
returns. In financing the acquisition of a long-term
asset, both commercial banks and productive investors
will be exposed to the risks entailed by mismatched
maturities. If banks grant long-term loans (and accept
savings at shorter maturities, as usually happens), they
are not only exposed to an obvious risk of default, but
also run liquidity and interest-rate risks. If their
financing is short-term, the productive investors will
have to be continually rolling over their short-term
credits, and will thus be exposed to the risk of higher
interest rates (which in turn increases the risk of default
on their bank loans).
Like any other agent, bankers have a preference
for liquidity, although this is defined differently in their
case than in that of financial investors. The preference
of banks for liquidity can be expressed by the following
argument. Given the stock of reserves held by
commercial banks, the creation of deposits represents
a reduction, albeit temporary, in the ratio between
reserves and high-liquidity assets on the one hand, and
sight deposits on the other. This ratio (hereafter α) is
a proxy for the increase in the maturities gap between
bank assets and liabilities. A lower α means greater
financial vulnerability for banks.
The smaller and shallower interbank and securities
markets are, the greater this vulnerability. For example,
in the absence of a large interbank market or a market
for securities bundled into securitized loans (secondary
securitization), the liquidity of loans in bank portfolios
will be zero. This means that Central Bank rediscounts
are essential to prevent bank liquidity problems.
Because such rediscounts are punitive in character,
however (either because their discount rate is higher
than the market rate, or because they entail a loss of
public confidence in the solidity of the bank applying
for them), banking institutions only use them as a last
resort.
Thus, given the structure of financial markets and
the access of banks to liquidity sources, the preference
of these institutions for liquidity can be traced directly
to the perception that default, liquidity and interest-rate
risks increase as deposits rise.
Interestingly, in periods of investment-based
growth, perceived default and liquidity risks tend to rise
simultaneously: while the portfolio of applicants for
bank funding tends to expand (implying the acceptance
of new customers with higher perceived risk), the ratio
between total liquid assets and loans falls.12 Since such
lending is financed by expanding short-term deposits,
the mismatches between liability and asset maturities
increase.
As perceived total risk rises, banks tend to become
more conservative for any given level of expectations
and begin to be more selective in their lending, seeking
more collateral and better returns on their operations.
Thus, over the course of the development process,
rising demand for credit (usually stronger than
aggregate demand growth, at times of economic
expansion) tends to be rationed for a given level of
expectations.13
In growing economies where financing comes
from bank lending, therefore, credit rationing is due not
only to information asymmetries, but potentially to
three other causes:14
i) bank financing levels come up against ceilings set
by banks (given their level of expectations) as
they respond to ever-increasing demand for credit;
ii) banks do not have the data they need for credit
analysis, for example in the case of new clients;
iii) data for accurately assessing the creditworthiness
of potential clients do not exist or are of no use.
In the latter case, for example, there tends to be
discrimination against innovative companies
(those that introduce new products or forms of
12
 It could be assumed that banks expanded their lending only to
existing clients, of course, but this would be an extreme case.
13
 See Sobreira and Studart (1997) for a formalization of this
hypothesis. It should be noted that in general, as Minsky (1982)
shows, bank expectations tend to rise at times of growth, which
creates the potential for lending booms.
14
 Credit rationing caused by information distribution problems
(information asymmetry) affects the financing (whether of
production or accumulation) of any kind of productive activity. This
is because a microeconomic problem comes into play: the market
may be very good at allocating resources, but to do this it must
have access to the information it needs to evaluate risk and, thence,
expected returns.
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production or operate in new domestic and
external markets) and against small and medium-
sized enterprises (Dosi, 1990).
Thus, at times of growth, credit is rationed mainly
by applying greater selectiveness to the growing
perceived risks. This rationing tends to favour
established enterprises that can offer higher-value
collateral, which may result in the exclusion of new
or small businesses and of investment projects whose
returns are uncertain or very long-term.
2. The role of capital markets, speculators and
individual and institutional investors
We have seen that, in the absence of long-term
securities (issued by companies in specialized markets
or sold by “universal banks”), investment financing
involves an increase in the financial vulnerability of
investors or financial intermediaries, defined for the
purposes of this study as the difference between the
average term of their assets and that of their liabilities.
The less developed the markets or the demand for
longer-term assets are, the greater the problem of asset
mismatch will be and the harder it will prove for private-
sector agents to undertake investment financing.
Long-term securities markets provide individual
investors with the liquidity they require (through
trading in secondary markets), increasing the
attractiveness to them of securities which for the
community as a whole are, by definition, illiquid.15
Such securities markets are, therefore, the main market
mechanisms allowing productive investors and
“universal banks” to extend the maturity of their
liabilities and therefore reduce asset mismatch. This
process of liability restructuring, whether by extending
maturities or converting debt, is what Keynes called
“funding”.
The extent to which capital markets accelerate
economic growth largely depends on the size and
development level of the primary markets where assets
are issued and where, consequently, capitalists can
obtain financing. The size of primary markets depends,
in turn, on how well organized secondary markets are
and how much business is transacted there, since these
markets give issuers the opportunity to place securities
more cheaply and give financial investors the liquidity
needed to offset the risk of capital losses. A large
volume of daily transactions is essential to the liquidity
of secondary markets, and this requires dynamic
participation by short-term investors (speculators).
Although speculators are essential to the market,
long-term individual and institutional investors are the
“anchor” that prevents volatility from becoming
excessive. A market dominated by short-term
speculative activity tends to inhibit the operations of
institutional investors, particularly those that are more
averse to capital risk, such as pension funds and
insurance companies.16
15
 In other words, if all the holders of a given financial security
decided to sell it simultaneously, its price would tend quickly to
zero.
16
 It is no coincidence, therefore, that growth in the United States
capital market involved the simultaneous expansion of company
listings and institutional investors. This subject will be returned to
later.
IV
The problems of development financing
In the context of development, the existence of
appropriate institutions, markets and market regulation
and supervision mechanisms makes possible, but does
not guarantee, investor access to long-term financing.17
Such access is essential for financially sound growth.
Besides considering the need for a suitable
regulatory and legal framework, any analysis of
17
 This section draws on Acevedo (2000).
18
 See Studart (1999) for an analysis of the role of institutional
investors in the provision of long-term funding.
development financing problems needs to take at least
two aspects into account: institutional underdevelopment
(including financial markets, institutional investors18
and the auxiliary institutions of financial intermediation)
and information problems (asymmetrical information
and uncertainty). These aspects are analysed below,
and will provide the basis for the policy agenda
presented in the following section.
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1. The weight of institutions and history
The system of liability restructuring (funding) through
capital markets requires a complex institutional system.
Alongside a legal and regulatory structure that
guarantees rights and reduces the likelihood of fraud,
these markets are constituted by agents with different
investment preferences and by providers (businesses
and government): institutional investors (including
pension funds) usually have a preference for longer-
term securities, while speculators buy and sell over
shorter terms.
Institutions of this kind do not develop as a
straightforward result of market forces. One of the
great problems connected with the development of
capital markets is the cost of maintaining them, which
largely depends on their original scale. For this scale
to be significant, the number and size of issuers, the
volume of funding that needs to be raised and the
number of long-term security purchasers are all of vital
importance. The development of the United States
capital market in the late nineteenth century was
basically underpinned by gigantic railway projects
required for the expansion into the interior of the
country. Not only were the original issuers large
companies, but income distribution in the United States
economy was better in the nineteenth century than it
is in most developing economies today. Combined with
relatively rapid economic growth, this led to a
considerable and steady increase in demand for assets
issued on the capital market. It also provided the basis
for an increase in the number of institutional investors,
as these tend to concentrate savings and invest them
in assets that are compatible with their contingent
liabilities, i.e., over longer terms.19
Where long-term assets are concerned, the scale
of both supply and demand appears to be crucial. This
is why highly developed securities trading markets are
not the historical norm, but the exception. Most
developed economies —the exceptions are the United
States and the United Kingdom— and developing
economies have different funding mechanisms.20 The
19
 This is not the place to go further into the role of railway
development in the growth of the United States capital market. The
reader is referred to Schumpeter (1939), particularly chapter VII,
for further information on the subject. See also Pollard (1964) for
an analysis of developments in the United Kingdom.
20
 In the United States model before deregulation in the 1990s,
commercial banks were usually the main providers of the finance
needed to begin investment projects. Investment banks played an
auxiliary role, providing loan guarantees for investing companies,
German system, in which funding is dominated by
private-sector “universal banks”, is an interesting and
much cited example.
The German model is characterized by
concentration in two respects: i) the type of financial
institutions, since universal banks predominate and the
role of specialist institutions (banks and non-banks) is
not significant, and ii) the large size of banking
institutions. Another structural characteristic of the
private-sector credit system is the weakness of the
capital markets as sources of corporate financing, even
in the case of large enterprises, which should in theory
have easy access to direct funding. The concentration
of financial saving in banking institutions makes them
the main potential purchasers of securities and shares.
This tends to depress the demand for those securities
that compete directly with the other core business of
banks: lending. Thus, in the German model it is indirect
financing that predominates, the intermediaries being
banks that capture savings in the form of deposits and
apply them as loans.
Regulation also played an important role in
shaping this type of financial system, although it
worked in a direction quite contrary to that seen in the
United States or the United Kingdom. In Germany, for
cultural and historical reasons, financial regulation
always sought to create the right financing conditions
for rapid economic growth and, indeed, reconstruction
in the post-war periods (Zysman, 1983, pp. 251-265).
Accordingly, no restrictions of any kind were placed
on the areas in which banks could operate; on the
contrary, they were —and still are— explicitly allowed
by local authorities to operate even in the non-financial
sector. This regulatory background largely explains the
tendency towards concentration in the German
financial system (in the two senses mentioned earlier)
as well as the tendency towards conglomeration or the
formation of large corporations led by universal banks,
which operate in various sectors of the economy.
Looking at specific financial structures helps to
reinforce the idea that there are different institutional
models for accumulation financing and there is no
reason to think that one is more efficient than another.
underwriting the flotation of the securities concerned when
conditions in the organized markets were favourable, and holding
in their portfolios securities (shares and bonds) issued by the
companies financed. It should be noted that, from a macroeconomic
point of view, the additional saving generated by the multiplier
process increases the liquidity of organized markets, and this in
turn determines the market conditions for such issues.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 5  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 5
THE STATE, THE MARKETS AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING • ROGÉRIO STUDART
27
Zysman (1983), for example, argues that systems as
different as those of the United States (based on capital
markets) and Germany (based on credit) were equally
effective for the development of their economies after
the War.
We can conclude that, regardless of the
institutional organization of the financing process, the
existence of such funding mechanisms may be essential
for maintaining the borrowing conditions of investor
companies and reducing their financial vulnerability to
potential changes in short-term interest rates.
Otherwise, growth may be restricted by the absence of
appropriate financing mechanisms or by a considerable
increase in the financial fragility of productive
investors and the banks that finance them.
2. Institutional underdevelopment: markets, uni-
versal banks and institutional investors
For finance mechanisms to exist, all that is necessary
is the existence of banking institutions with the ability
to issue means of payment. Nonetheless, we have
already seen that development financing based on bank
credit tends to lead to financial fragility and credit
rationing, factors that jeopardize the continuity of
growth. This is because, firstly, financial instability
tends to depress the economy21 and, secondly, because
growth can be constrained by the lack of investment
financing mechanisms. An economy that lacks suitable
funding systems is an economy with little financial
slack for economic development.
Capital market systems are perhaps the most
complex problem of development financing since, for
institutional progress to be made with them, not only
does there need to be a suitable system of regulation
and supervision, but at least four interrelated factors
come into play.
In the case of capital market-based systems, these
factors are:22
i) the size and depth of markets for long-term
corporate securities, and
ii) the size and investment profile of institutional
investors.
In the case of universal bank systems, the factors
are:
iii) the investment profile of financial investors (families
and institutional investors) in these banks’ assets,
and
iv) the profile and potential role of banks in long-term
financing.
Institutional investors not only help bring robust
capital markets into being, but stimulate them to attain
greater efficiency and depth, as Vittas argues:
“Experience from Anglo-American countries
suggests large potential benefits from the
interactive process between institutional investors
and securities markets. Institutional investors can
act as a countervailing force to the dominant
position of commercial banks and thus promote
competition and efficiency in the financial
systems. They can stimulate financial innovation,
modernize capital markets, enhance transparency
and information disclosure, and strengthen
corporate governance” (Vittas, 1998, p. 6).
Nonetheless, the increase in the number and size
of institutional investors in the financial system should
not be regarded as a cure-all for the development of
long-term private-sector financing mechanisms. The
expansion of institutional investors (pension funds, for
instance) does not in itself lead to an increase in the
supply of credits for investment financing. Such an
increase continues to depend largely on the earning and
saving capacity of families and businesses.
At the same time, the growth and development of
institutional investors make it easier to match financial
instruments to the maturities usually required in the
productive investment process, because such
institutions (which include pension funds, mutual funds
and insurers) have long-term contingent liabilities, and
this enables them to invest in long-term instruments
such as shares and bonds.
Thus, the existence of organized markets for long-
term securities (such as capital markets) and of
institutional investors with a preference for long-term
investments could ease the problem of mismatched
asset maturities. After carrying out an investment, the
investing companies could have access to securities
with maturities that were more compatible with those
of their investments, and thus pay off short-term credits
obtained from commercial banks.
This is why investment financing in most
economies with small capital markets is carried out
21
 See, for example, Minsky (1982).
22
 In the current debate, excessive importance is attached to the
regulation and supervision of financial markets as a way of fostering
development financing mechanisms. Appropriate regulation and
careful supervision are obviously indispensable to the operation of
any market but, for the reasons already given, they will not in
themselves resolve the problems of development financing.
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through universal banking institutions capable of drawing
in long-term funds (such as the German universal
banks), or through public-sector banks that carry out
funding using fiscal or para-fiscal resources (as in most
developing economies). These are alternative ways of
avoiding the problem of mismatched maturities, which
can constrain the expansion of long-term financing for
economic growth.
The development of a long-term bank securities
market is attended by some of the same problems as
are faced by corporate securities markets, including
those of scale. After the War, for instance, Germany
experienced a large rise in the demand for long-term
bank assets, as a result of:
i) the concentration of investment in reconstruction
and the equipping of industry;
ii) the particular role of the universal banks in the
direct financing of the accumulation process;
iii) economic growth associated with a fairly equitable
income distribution;
iv) the preference of German savers for assets issued
by universal banks, as capital markets were tiny
to begin with.
Thanks to the increase in demand for bank
securities, insurance and long-term saving instruments,
universal banks were in a position to capture resources
with different maturities, from sight deposits to longer-
term ones. Consequently, the management of
mismatched maturities is carried out within the asset
structure of these institutions themselves.
Having the right institutions to finance and fund
accumulation seems to be a basic prerequisite for
financially sound development. Even if we assumed the
existence of fully developed markets or banking
institutions with the characteristics of the German
universal banks, however, there would still be problems
caused by information failures and uncertainty in the
funding process. Once we have analysed the aspects
related to information we can conclude our analysis of
the problems of development financing.
3. Information failures and uncertainty
Development is usually characterized by a combination
of growth and structural change, with innovative
companies often introducing new technologies or new
ways of organizing production, or entering a sector
where learning costs and economies of scale may
constitute barriers to entry (Dosi, 1990). In these
situations, uncertainty about the future and thus
investment risk are high, but decrease as infant
industries mature.23
The logical consequence of what has just been
said is that information problems increase considerably
in economies that are going through a stage of growth
and structural change. If our hypothesis holds true, the
financing problem in developing economies is not
confined to information distribution or failures in
relation to various projects with known returns, but
extends to uncertainty about the outcome of efforts to
introduce a new production pattern or to find new
markets, as well as the consequences of these factors
for the sector and the macroeconomy.
Table 1, which distinguishes two types of
uncertainty, illustrates this: type I uncertainty can be
reduced to risk, while type II cannot. Established firms
and sectors with a performance track record, generally
in the form of periodic balance sheets, and with
relatively high collateral and marginal investments, are
type I risks. Type II risks are new firms with no track
record and little collateral to set against the risks
incurred.
Whether or not there is a private-sector finance
and funding structure, type II information problems
impede risk analysis and thus the private-sector
intermediation of resources for particular firms. This
cannot be regarded as a market failure: the efficient
markets hypothesis itself is based on the idea that
private-sector institutions and financial markets are
efficient at collecting, processing and distributing
information. Obviously these markets and institutions,
even in a fully competitive environment, do not act as
providers of finance in conditions of uncertainty that
cannot be reduced to risk.
According to the definition of economic
development given previously (as a process of growth
associated with structural change), and assuming we
are correct in our conclusions about the effects of
uncertainty that cannot be reduced to risk on the
financing process, the role of the State in development
financing is far more significant than the conventional
model would suggest. It is no coincidence that public-
sector development institutions in developing countries
arise primarily as instruments for applying development
strategies and only secondarily as a response to
information failures in markets. The role of these
23
 See Moreira (1995, chapters 1-4) for a modern analysis of the
infant industry concept and its use to justify the application of in-
dustrial promotion policies in the development process.
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institutions is not confined to intermediation between
savers, other financial intermediaries and investors.
This is what will be analysed below.
4. Policy and the role of development banks
What do the conventional models have in common as
regards the role of the State in development financing?
In our view, it is the idea that the State is external to
the financing of the capitalist accumulation process.
Whereas in some models State intervention is seen as
distorting relative prices, reducing the efficiency with
which resources are used, in others this intervention is
seen as a last resort for dealing with intractable market
failures.
The approach taken by the present study implies
that the State can play a role of great importance in
fostering more solid sources of development financing,
given that:
i) institution-building policies can (and should)
mitigate the problems of incomplete markets,
facilitating the creation of finance or funding
mechanisms that use private-sector resources.
These policies range from the development of
appropriate regulations and oversight mechanisms
to the provision of incentives for the creation of
long-term securities markets.24 Since institutional
investors are vital for the consolidation of such
markets, these policies also have to offer
incentives (regulatory and otherwise) that increase
the attractiveness of the securities concerned;
ii) direct financing policies can help construct a path
towards development and the establishment of
what Stiglitz and Uy (1996) call a “vision” by
creating new information and making it possible
for agents to organize themselves and plan for the
future on the basis of optimizing behaviour. This
is what Aoki, Murdock and Okuno-Fujiwara
(1997) consider “market enhancement”.
These two lines of policy are complementary. A
developmentalist State needs to orient its policies
essentially towards the implementation of a
development project and the consolidation of particular
sectors as part of that.25 Public-sector development
financing policies (and their instruments, the
development banks) emerge, therefore, as tools for
implementing development strategies, channelling
24
 An example of this was the development of the mortgage asset
markets that now form the basis of the United States property
financing system. As Feeney (1995, chapter 5) puts it: “The US
securitized market has been greatly influenced by a number of
government and quasi government institutions, which have made
TABLE 1
Information problems when growth is accompanied by structural change
Type I Type II
Established companies and sectors with relatively
high collateral and marginal investment.
Information distribution problems (information
asymmetry, etc.).
Monitoring, selection and lending problems;
incomplete or non-existent markets; imperfect
competition.
Credit rationing caused by a rapid increase in the
financial vulnerability of commercial banks.
Creation of new companies or sectors; entry into
sectors with entry barriers due to learning costs and
economies of scale, or into new markets; relatively
little collateral.
Information from past offers no reliable guide to
the future performance of investing companies.
Risk cannot be evaluated, so that private-sector
financing sources are not available.






possible the creation of a liquid secondary market in mortgages...
The modern home mortgage in the United States and the securitized
mortgage market itself are initially the result of the 1934 National
Housing Act. This Act created the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) as a mechanism for attracting private capital into the housing
market.” The chapter in Feeney referred to presents an interesting
analysis of the role of public-sector institutions in the development
of this market, now the world’s largest domestic market in private-
sector securities.
25
 This seems increasingly to be the conclusion arrived at by authors
as varied as Amsden and Euh (1990), World Bank (1994) and Stiglitz
and Uy (1996) in relation to the success of the South-East Asian
model.
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long-term funding into strategic sectors and creating
investment opportunities, not only within the sectors
chosen but also in those with which the sectors
concerned have forward and backward linkages.
Consequently, development banks are not just
intermediaries between savers, other financial
intermediaries and investors, but enablers of market
creation and producers of the information required.
Once standardized, with known quality and returns,
their instruments can be traded in private-sector
securities and credit markets.26 In other words, once
these markets have been created and returns on the
instruments generated have been assured, the
attractiveness of their securities for the private-sector
capital market opens up debt rescheduling or
conversion opportunities that do not require recourse
to public funds. Public money should be treated as a
scarce resource, given the demand for social spending
that development entails.
Again, the rules for State intervention in the
development financing process should be classified by
how complete the markets and information for the
sectors to be financed are. Table 2 gives the results of
a simple policy classification exercise.
The table is an attempt to classify decisions on
State intervention and the type of policy required to
deal with problems of incomplete information and
markets. In the case of sectors and businesses that
have access to financial markets and to all the
information they need, no State intervention is
required. This is the position of large enterprises listed
in organized securities markets, which not only have
access to these markets but publish regular audited
balance sheets.
Moving towards the right of the table from this
category, i.e., to the “Asymmetrical information” and
“No information” columns, the need for government
intervention increases. In the case of established firms
that are in a position to publish balance sheets and
whose future prospects can easily be assessed by the
market, what is needed to deal with information
asymmetries is a policy that encourages the spread of
information, rather than a standing policy of selective
lending. Firstly, credit risk databases (available to
private-sector financial institutions) could reduce the
problems of asymmetry here. Secondly, public-sector
financing institutions could make credit lines
conditional on these companies raising funds in share
or long-term securities markets, which would help
make the issuer more transparent to the financial
market. This is what we have called better information
distribution policies (BI).
When information needed by the market to
analyse risk is not available (uncertainty), a distinction
has to be drawn between two possible categories of
firm. The first includes established small companies
that, because of their size, do not normally have
TABLE 2
A classification of development financing-oriented
public policies





(MD) policies, including incentives
for institutional investors to invest
in long-term private-sector assets
MD




Selective lending (SL) policies











 The Republic of Korea offers a useful example for analysis of
the role of financial development institutions, not because the State
is given a major role in financing, but because of the characteristics
of the country’s remarkable economic development, entailing as it
has considerable long-term financing risks and uncertainties. See
UNCTAD (1996, part 2, chapters 1 and 2) for a brief and accurate
analysis of the recent development strategy of that country (and
other fast-growing Asian economies).
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accurate accounting records or much in the way of
collateral. In this case, expanding access to private-
sector financing is necessary to encourage the use of
normal business accounting (a BI policy) and to create
collateral funds that can be administered by
development banks.
In the second category are businesses whose track
record cannot be taken as a guide to future performance
(because of their investment profile) and which have
relatively little collateral. This category includes
companies using advanced technology, or those
entering markets that have not been much developed
in the country (for example, a new product which has
no substitutes in the market). In this case, however
developed the financial markets are they will be unable
to evaluate the risks and thus will not be in a position
to channel resources (whether through lending or
through security and share issues) to these investments.
Direct financing may be a viable alternative, at least
until the company is established and the information
needed for risk analysis is available. Use could also be
made of some measures to raise private money, such
as the creation of guarantee funds and risk sharing
systems. These are what may be considered market
enhancement policies.
The less organized markets are, and the less
complete the information available, the greater will be
the need for State involvement in development
financing. In theory, as table 2 shows, microenterprises
and small and medium-sized firms should be given




If we apply a Keynesian approach, there are two
problems with development finance:
i) In the absence of appropriate finance and funding
institutions, such as the universal banks in
Germany or long-term asset markets, rising credit
risk and the exposure of private-sector agents
when outgoings exceed expectations can lead to
bank credit rationing and dangerously increase the
financial vulnerability of the agents involved in
long-term financing (banks and productive
investors). Institutional underdevelopment may,
therefore, result in financially unsound
development and, ultimately, in financial crises.
ii) Information problems in development financing
go beyond the conventional difficulties of poor
information distribution (asymmetry). “Emerging”
and innovative sectors, as well as small and
medium-sized enterprises in general, find it hard
to obtain credit because the information made
available is unreliable for risk analysis purposes.
They have little or no collateral and their client
relationships with private-sector financial
institutions, if they have any, are underdeveloped.
Public-sector financing policies can consolidate
production sectors, making their future issues of assets
in private-sector markets more attractive. In other
words: as these sectors consolidate, information
problems in financial intermediation tend to diminish
in many cases, expanding the scope for private-sector
intermediation of resources to finance accumulation.
The opportunity arising from this process can only
be taken up on a large scale if the necessary funding
institutions exist. This, in turn, requires policies to
bring into being a regulatory and institutional system
appropriate for the development of long-term bank and
corporate securities markets in the private sector—
including larger purchases of long-term private-sector
assets by institutional investors. It is in this way that
institution-building policies can generate development
financing mechanisms that are more financially robust.
The early twenty-first century offers significant
opportunities and encouragement for policy action to
create sound development financing mechanisms.
Firstly, the financial markets (particularly international
ones) changed considerably in the 1980s and 1990s,
bringing in new methods of raising capital
(securitization) and segmenting risk (derivatives, for
example). Secondly, recent events in the financial
markets have opened up the possibility of applying
longer-term institutional development policies aimed
at strengthening the role of institutional investors and
long-term securities markets in the financing of larger
firms that can more easily access these markets.
Nonetheless, the difficulties have not diminished.
At a time when the possible routes towards
development are changing and external financing is
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becoming ever scarcer and more volatile, the
availability of sufficient domestic financing with the
required maturities is becoming a prerequisite for
financially sustainable development. As Stiglitz (1993)
states, the dilemma now is not whether the State should
intervene, but how best it can do it.
(Original: Portuguese)
